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No Pain, No Gain: Taking PESCO to the Gym 
Tania Lațici
It is fair to assume that at least one out of 
three readers of this paper have at some 
point in their life accepted to join a group of 
friends to do regular sporting activities 
together. While this idea sounds great in 
principle (we become fitter while building 
our friendships), when the day comes, only 
a few of those who committed actually 
show up. Excuses abound: more important 
commitments; too busy; jealous friends 
who were not invited in the first place. This 
is why a much more effective method of 
keeping commitments is through peer-
pressure: having a designated buddy 
keeping tabs on you, making sure you 
show up and help you do the work. Vice 
versa, you are responsible for helping and 
motivating another friend, until the square 
is circled. So, what does Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have to 
do with becoming fitter? Everything. 
 
THE TIME IS NOW   
The decision of 25 EU members in 2017 to 
deepen their defence cooperation by launching 
PESCO has been the topic of numerous analyses, 
perhaps most notably in this outlet. Despite the 
enthusiasm with which PESCO was received, 
even its staunchest supporters now start to doubt 
its chances of success. A ravaged post-COVID19 
European economic front is accelerating the 
urgency to spend expectedly strained defence 
budgets smartly, that is coordinated and jointly. 
In a dark sense, the timing of the coronavirus 
pandemic could be used as an opportunity during 
the ongoing PESCO strategic review process to 
capitalise on this urgency.  A close inspection 
shows that at least 17 of the current PESCO 
projects could leave the participating Member 
States (pMS) better prepared for the next health 
crisis. But if PESCO doesn’t start to concretely 
deliver in the next years, it will likely become a 
mere addition to a rather abundant list of failed 
plans for tighter EU defence cooperation. A 
peer-reviewing process could just be the 
incentive PESCO needs to make its wheels turn 
faster. 
 
The list of PESCO criticisms is generous. While 
some argue that the initial avantguard intention 
behind PESCO failed due to its indulgent 
membership, others highlight that too few pMS 
have put their hearts and souls into it. Some of its 
projects fall short in terms of filling capability 
gaps and are anyway not advancing fast enough, 
 
 





one often hears. Finally, its 20 binding 
commitments are not enforceable despite their 
legality and there is no naming-and-shaming 
foreseen in the annual assessments. So, we have 
PESCO, we need PESCO, but PESCO does not 
work as we need it to. Questions on the drivers 
of PESCO projects and broader political 
motivations for delivery thus emerge.  
 
At the end of the day, PESCO’s broad aim is to 
ensure that pMS, through deeper collaboration, 
achieve a fitter defence posture and the ability to 
undertake the range of missions in accordance 
with the EU level of ambition. Ideally, jointly 
developing projects should also result in a 
stronger shared strategic culture and deepen 
interoperability and cooperation. Similarly to an 
unmotivated friend, more pressure through peer-
reviewing could play a catalyst role in achieving 
one’s ambitions, be they fitness or defence 
capabilities. This brief puts forward an argument 
for the benefits of a peer-reviewing system in 
PESCO inspired by that of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 1  On the eve of PESCO’s first strategic 
review, it is time to make PESCO more strategic.  
 
A PESCO PEER-REVIEWING PROCESS. 
OPPORTUNITY FOR ANOTHER ACRONYM?  
Peer-reviewing is believed to hone a wide range 
of benefits, including improved performance, 
increasing mutual trust and creating a system of 
mutual accountability. The OECD defines peer-
reviewing as a ‘systematic examination and 
assessment of the performance of a State by other 
States, with the ultimate goal of helping the 
reviewed State improve its policy-making, adopt 
best practices and comply with established 
standards and principles’. Peer-reviewing 
naturally relies on mutual trust and on pMS’ 
confidence in the process. In this sense, it is 
distinguished from peer-pressure, which in itself 
can condition the effectiveness of a peer-review, 
depending on the ‘influence and persuasion 
exercised by the peers’.  The latter can thus form 
a solid basis for generating peer-pressure. If the 
OECD can launch a peer-review process 
mandated by its Ministerial Council, why couldn’t 
the EU? 
 
The preconditions for establishing a functional 
one-to-one peer-reviewing mechanism in 
PESCO would entail pMS ownership and 
unanimity regarding implementation, indicators 
and conditions. Willingness to provide the 
required staffing as well as access to internal 
structures and information are sine qua non. The 
responsibility for guaranteeing a credible process 
would lie with the coordinating body (plausibly 
the PESCO Secretariat). Though ‘fair’ indicators 
might be difficult for all pMS to agree upon, more 
precise political guidance stemming from the 
upcoming strategic reflection – set to culminate 
in a Strategic Compass – could serve as 
benchmarks for assessing countries’ 
performance.  
 
A performance-based ranking of pMS at the end 
of a cycle could be envisioned, though the 
ranking per se might prove counterproductive 
(and likely politically unacceptable) given the 
differences between Members’ defence 
apparatuses and political (wo)manpower to 
deliver.  Nevertheless, a precedent exists. The EU 
has been conducting a single market scoreboard 
since 1997. The scoreboard evaluates how EU 
rules were applied and how Member States 
contributed to the improvement of the single 
market. Its latest edition, published in July 2019, 
for example, uses a traffic light system to rank 
each country based on performance indicators. 
Such a system is thus not only palatable but could 
also provide an opportunity to demonstrate that 
the EU is more than the largest single market and 
trade bloc, but also a cohesive defence actor.   
 
 





The EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD) could, in theory, address 
several issues a peer-review process would aim to 
solve but, in its current state, it cannot. Though 
the rationale behind having a CARD process is 
sound, its voluntary character and narrow focus 
on the Capability Development Plan is unlikely to 
nudge Member States towards better 
implementation. A peer-reviewing process would 
be more appropriate for at least four reasons. 
First, having the pMS firmly in the driver’s seat 
would shield the system from claims of 
transferring additional responsibilities to the EU 
since it would unfold in the spirit of the 
intergovernmental principle. Second, a more 
mixed grouping of EU stakeholders (as in the 
PESCO Secretariat, which includes the EDA, the 
EEAS and the EUMS) is more suited to 
coordinate such an exercise, rather than a single 
actor as is the case with CARD, which is led by 
the European Defence Agency. Third, concrete 
observations and recommendations resulting 
from a review would complement the technical 
reporting provided through CARD and feed into 
a larger capability development picture. And 
finally, the political and diplomatic dimensions of 
a peer-review system are more fitted to generate 
delivery incentives and trigger reform in national 
defence planning processes compared to a largely 
technocratic report highlighting shortfalls.  
 
NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP) 
showcases the value of political pressure for 
generating results. The so-called C-1 ‘multilateral’ 
meetings during each NDPP cycle is the place 
where each Ally’s progress and planning are 
‘exposed’ and up for debate by all the others. 
While this NATO context is irreplicable in the 
EU, it does illustrate that similar peer-pressure 
and scrutiny can yield results in terms of cohesion 
and filling capability targets.  
 
The OECD argues that the greatest pressure to 
act occurs when performance assessments are 
made public. In an EU/PESCO context, this role 
could fit the European Parliament (EP) –at the 
time of writing demanding in a draft report that 
deepening defence cooperation be proportional 
with its scrutiny responsibilities in defence - like 
a hand in a glove. The recommendations at the 
end of a peer-review cycle need not be legally 
binding, at least not at first, but instead provide 
concrete, tailored and realistic steps to be taken. 
The EP could, in theory, serve as an additional 
layer of pressure for pMS to deliver. 
 
Granted, security and defence are a more delicate 
area for peer-reviews than, say, development, due 
to the confidentiality and sensitivity of the data 
involved. However, as PESCO has the aim to 
deepen defence and military cooperation 
between its members and to jointly develop 
defence capability projects, sensitive-information 
sharing is implicit. On the one hand, it would be 
at the reviewee’s discretion what information to 
share with the reviewer. But on the other, the 
more information is shared, the more a country 
can demonstrate its efforts in meeting 
obligations. Transparency can be an opportunity 
for a country to legitimise a course of action. Plus, 
how could opponents justify themselves given 
their country’s legal commitments and 
reinforcing discourse around PESCO? 
 
Though the most adept follower of peer-reviews, 
having made use of them since its creation, the 
OECD is not alone. Others have made use of 
such systems to incentivise members to deliver, 
including the IMF, the UN, the WTO, and as 
exemplified above, even the EU. So why not 












HOW WOULD IT WORK?  
The subjects of peer-review would logically be 
PESCO pMS following a sequence and 
attribution established by the PESCO Secretariat 
as part of the broader PESCO governance. The 
latter would have the delicate task of developing 
a methodology (based on pre-agreed criteria) and 
a bespoke pairing system. The principle of 
‘everyone is equal before the Law’ applies in such 
a system as big countries could (and should) find 
themselves reviewed by smaller countries. As the 
impartial body, the PESCO Secretariat could 
support the whole PPRP much alike a railway 
traffic planning and management keeping all the 
trains running on schedule (maybe not the 
Belgian one). The impartiality of its staff is 
imperative. 
 
In practice, peer-reviews would entail close 
exchanges, field missions and staff secondments 
of civil servants in the reviewee’s relevant 
ministry (usually defence). The reviewed country 
thus assumes responsibility for facilitating these 
activities and for disclosing information.  
Precedents exist here too. The established 
practice of Franco-German staff secondment 
across ministries, for example. Or the custom of 
seconding civil servants to the EU Council 
Presidency holder. Professional socialisation, 
networking and better mutual understanding 
would thus be facilitated by the PPRP, 
particularly between paired countries that might 
not have the strongest bilateral relationship. 
Reviewers could, for example, evaluate intra-
ministry coordination between desk officers 
dealing with the different capability development 
processes, linkages with the national and 
international defence industry, including SMEs, 
to identify eye-catching projects and suitable 
companies to implement existing ones, but also 
ensuring robust channels between the relevant 
departments and political cabinets or help 
improve dialogues with civil society and 
academia.  
 
This practice would not entail additional financial 
commitments – the PESCO Secretariat is 
financed from the EU budget (or includes 
seconded experts from MS) - and civil servants 
from each pMS would equally be posted through 
secondments. The minimal human resource 
effort would be worth it given the significant 
potential for added-value. For most countries, 
particularly those with more rigid bureaucratic 
structures, this process could even be a stimulus 
for national and institutional reform. 
 
A PPRP cycle could take one year: the review as 
such 9 months; the performance evaluation and 
report drafting in the remaining months. The 
reviewee could also submit an evaluation report 
for the purpose of fine-tuning the PPRP as it 
evolves. The peer-review report would assess 
performance according to pre-defined criteria 
(potentially resulting from the ongoing strategic 
reflection), against the binding commitments, the 
Annual Report, and the National Implementation 
Plan (NIP) of the previous year. Submitting the 
NIPs alongside the peer-review report would 
provide PESCO members and the High 
Representative with more tools not only for 
evaluating performance but also national project 
implementation.  
 
Once established, the PPRP should have a 
regularity of at least 5 years with initially a yearly 
review cycle before its overall effectiveness can 
be evaluated. The ongoing PESCO strategic 
review is an ideal opportunity to table this 
proposal. Its evaluation could then be subject to 












WHAT DOES THE LAW OFFER?  
A PPRP could be institutionalised and attached 
to the binding commitments through a Council 
Decision. Since with the establishment of 
PESCO Member States ‘made more binding 
commitments to one another’ (Article 42.6, 
TEU), it could be inferred that they are also 
accountable to one another. This process could 
simply feed into the annual assessment 
conducted by the High Representative.  
 
Jointly fulfilling capability shortfalls is a key goal 
of PESCO. Hence, any process that would 
stimulate deeper cooperation, shared experiences 
and capability development processes through 
advice, institutional reform and budgetary 
efficiency (getting more bang for the buck) 
should be welcomed.  
 
Since pMS adopt projects by unanimity, it would 
follow that such a process would also require it. 
Unanimity is desirable to ensure the credibility of 
the process and the ownership of pMS. The first 
step would be for the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) to table this proposal, as 
articulated by the PESCO Secretariat. It would 
then be discussed in the PESCO formats of the 
Politico-Military Group and the EU Military 
Committee. Finally, it would arrive on the table 
of PESCO Defence Ministers in the Foreign 
Affairs Council.  
 
‘The assessors’, the 2017 PESCO notification 
notes, ‘will focus on the credibility of PESCO 
commitments by screening Member States NIPs, 
factual provisions and contributions to projects’. 
While this provision makes reference to the PSC, 
it could be understood more widely to provide a 
mandate to peer-reviewers. As a final legal 
remark, the Council Decision establishing 
PESCO would also make a PPRP compliant with 
at least three of the 20 binding commitments2. In 
other words, the legal space is there for s/he who 
wishes to see it.  
 
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS? 
A peer-review mechanism could help PESCO 
fulfil the ‘4 Cs’ listed in the notification for 
achieving common security and defence: 
coherence, continuity, coordination and 
collaboration. It is a win-win scenario: the 
reviewee is under pressure to deliver and receives 
tailored advice, while the reviewer takes home 
lessons-learned. PESCO as a whole becomes a 
tighter group with a coherent way forward. At the 
same time, naming-and-shaming would be 
proportionate since pMS are equally exposed and 
at risk of criticism. This could either serve as an 
incentive to perform (fearing the shame) or 
altogether avoid giving any rough criticism to 
ensure reciprocity (shameless). To avoid the 
latter, the PESCO Secretariat can ensure a 
rotation each cycle that avoids close overlaps 
between reviewee and reviewer, as ideally one 
pMS reviews another each year of the first five.  
 
This process would uphold the treasured 
intergovernmental character of European 
defence while potentially increasing its 
Europeanisation. Leaping into the PPRP would 
take pMS out of their comfort zone and cement 
bilateral cooperation in diverse constellations 
while benefiting overall European defence 
cooperation. Ideally, it would also lead to PESCO 
earning a reference in national defence planning 
processes. This would have the twofold effect of 
increasing its legitimacy and justifying financial 
commitments to PESCO projects.  
 
The working assumption of positive experiences 
and results stemming from a PPRP, could endow 
national politicians with concrete deliverables to 
show voters at home. This could be part of a 
wider citizen awareness and strategic 
communication campaign about the threats and 
 
 





challenges faced by the continent. Done 
correctly, this could ensure more citizen buy-in 
and thus higher stakes for delivering PESCO - 
together with the whole EU defence package.  
 
Solidarity between Member States stems from 
mutual trust and joint stakes: just as countries on 
the Atlantic coast could become more empathetic 
to Eastern Members’ threat perceptions, so could 
Europe’s South to its North. These are building 
blocks of a shared strategic culture and 
convergence. Sharing best practices, lessons 
learned, and staff-to-staff exchanges through a 
PPRP would provide pMS with a solid basis for 
increasing mutual trust. The timing could not be 
more ripe as the transatlantic security guarantee 
becomes more shaky and EU Members realise 
with every crisis that they can only rely on each 
other. But reliance rests on trust.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Business as usual clearly does not work as it was 
hoped. A peer-review mechanism is an 
opportunity to switch gears and develop a new 
way of cooperating. Without risking a Europe of 
two or three speeds, showing vulnerability to a 
peer usually serves to build trust, empathy and, 
oftentimes, integration.  
 
A PPRP would substantiate the annual 
assessment of PESCO and its projects. It would 
also depoliticise sensitive decisions such as 
scraping certain projects or even enacting the 
nuclear Article 46.4 TEU to suspend pMS that 
are not delivering. The “nuclear” option is never 
easy, but recurring evidence of malperformance 
could be the ammunition needed to pull the 
trigger. The nuclear option could even foresee a 
role for the EP to weigh into this decision and 
provide an extension of scrutiny. 
 
Finally, realising a European Defence Union 
requires compliance with the rules, better 
incentives and greater strategic convergence. 
Though uncomfortable at first, a peer-review 
system would help Member States advance 
towards this goal. But, as your motivated gym-
buddy would say: no pain, no gain. 
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1 The basis for the technical arguments regarding peer-reviewing mechanisms has been the OECD’s 
study ‘Peer Review. An OECD Tool for Co-operation and Change’ from 2003.                                                                                                                        
2 For example: (b) committing pMS to ‘bring their defence apparatus into line with each other’ and by 
‘encouraging cooperation’; 13, committing to agree on ‘common technical and operational standards of 
forces’; and (d), ‘work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good’ 
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